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Introduction 
The ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004, followed by the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 
2007, has profoundly altered the way the European Union functions. But with hindsight, 
it turned out that none of the often apocalyptic scenarios predicted before 2004 has 
materialised: neither was the EU-15 widely swamped with a flood of migrants from its 
new member countries, nor was the EU budget blooded to death, nor have its structures 
become paralysed. However, public opinion – and thus politicians – in the old member 
states give little credit to enlargement, and there is limited appetite for promoting the 
accession of further member states. 
This article tries to analyse the reasons behind the lack of appetite of most EU member 
states for further enlargement. It will challenge some of the conventional perceptions 
of enlargement and propose a double approach to get the process back on track: by 
tackling political challenges from a technical angle and by paying more attention to the 
perception of enlargement related problems. 
The stumbling blocks: political blockages and public opinion
In  2011,  the  EU  has  five  candidate  countries  (Iceland,  Croatia,  FYROM,  Montenegro, 
Turkey) with whom accession negotiations have either started or are about to start, and 
four potential candidates (Serbia, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo) which first have to qualify to 
become candidates by meeting a number of criteria in the field of political and economic 
reform. Whereas Croatia (population: 5m) and in particular Iceland (population: 0.3m) raise 
few concerns due to their size and their relatively little impact their accession will have on 
the EU, the accession of the other Western Balkan countries is more controversial, due to 
their poor reputation and to the number of internal problems (such as ethnic conflicts or 
the lack of rule of law).  But the most controversial issue is arguably the country that made 
by far the biggest progress in its way on adopting European norms and standards: Turkey. 
By  just  looking  at  the  mere  technicalities,  Turkey’s  accession  does  not  seem  more 
complicated than the other (potential) candidates: With all its flaws (especially regarding 
the freedom of expression), it is nevertheless a rather well functioning democracy; it has 
reasonably well functioning institutions, and makes progress towards EU integration in 
most of the policy fields that are required by Brussels. However, in reality, the process 60
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grinded  to  a  halt,  for  two  reasons:  first,  the  blockage  of 
the  accession  negotiations  due  to  the  unresolved  Cyprus 
question,  with  EU  member  Cyprus  vetoing  the  opening  of 
further  negotiation  chapters  (and  the  closing  of  currently 
open chapters). Second, public opinion in most of the Member 
countries is negative regarding Turkey’s accession1. 
The freezing of Turkey’s accession negotiations, the standstill 
in EU-NATO relations, and the danger of regional instability in 
the Western Balkans - due to a failure to address the Kosovo 
issue - are directly linked to the unresolved Cyprus question. 
With  no  solution  to  these  fundamental  questions  of  EU 
strategic interests in sight, both the enlargement process and 
the Common Security and Defence Policy risk becoming lame 
ducks, thus undermining the relevance of the EU as a global 
player and strategic actor.  
A technical bypass to political problems?
How might these deeply entrenched political blockages be overcome? Here it might be 
helpful to remember that the process of rebuilding Europe after WWII started as a technical 
process (with the Coal and Steel Community) before becoming more obviously political. 
A good recent example of a technical solution to a political problem is the answer found 
to address the fear of paralysis in EU decision making after the 2004 enlargement: some 
technical modifications in the Council of Minister’s rules of procedure - hardly spectacular 
and rarely noticed by people outside the Brussels bubble - had a definite and positive 
impact and made decision making after 2004 easier than before2. In the same way, the 
freeze of Turkey’s accession negotiations and of EU-NATO relations - due to differences 
between NATO member Turkey and EU member Cyprus - could be overcome by taking a 
more pragmatic approach (i.e. increasing security for EU and NATO staff in Afghanistan as 
the result of exchange of intelligence between the two organisations), instead of leaving 
the issue to emotionally charged history-laden political debates in both capitals.
Problems and their perception: public opinion matters
The other much underrated challenge to the accession process is public opinion in the 
member states. This is in particular true with regard to Turkey3. Technically, it would be 
only a question of time before Turkey (and the other candidates) meet the criteria for 
membership: being fully fledged democracies with a competitive economy that have 
taken on board the 120,000 pages of EU rules and regulations. But of course, enlargement 
is also highly political, as any accession (even after the Lisbon Treaty) has to be ratified by 
all existing members. The governments of the member states know that the perspective 
of having Turkey as (soon to be) biggest, rather poor and Muslim member - with agenda 
setting powers - is hardly appealing to most of their voters. Hiding behind the vox populi 
is, in fact, a convenient way for governments to discard the 
responsibility for the rejection of Turkey on their voters. 
Turkey might have very strong arguments why the EU 
would benefit from having it as a member: its economic 
and demographic dynamism, its role for regional security 
and stability, as a political bridge to the Muslim world, as 
a buffer zone towards the Middle East and its moderating 
influence on Muslims within and outside the borders of 
the EU.  
Whereas these arguments are relevant and valuable, they are not likely to convince a 
broader public more susceptible to fears of immigration, of radical Islam and of an EU 
losing its European character. Therefore, Turkey will eventually realise that this debate 
cannot be won with rational arguments alone and that they also have to target existing 
underbelly fears through public diplomacy and perception management4. Turkey also 
will have to realise the extent to which negative public opinion in particular member 
states is the result of often suboptimal integration of the Turkish diasporas into their host 
societies and to be more proactive in looking for solutions.
Turkey will eventually realise that this 
debate cannot be won with rational 
arguments alone.
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The EU in 2020: a look into the enlargement crystal ball
At this point, it might be useful to move beyond analysing the existing problems and to 
engage into some out-of-the-box thinking in order to overcome the current stalemate. 
The author therefore takes the liberty of offering a hypothetic and optimistic - but maybe 
not entirely unrealistic – agenda of how the enlargement process could eventually unfold 
during the next decade: 
  2012:  After  repeated  casualties  among  EU  Police  trainers  in  Afghanistan,  Turkey 
  decides to drop its veto on the sharing of NATO intelligence with the EU. Also, in order   
  to put pressure on the incoming Cypriot EU Presidency, Turkey decides unilaterally   
  to open its ports temporarily to Cypriot vessels. Accession negotiations are opened   
  with FYROM after a compromise with Greece on the name issue (using the term   
  ‘Republic  of  Northern  Macedonia’  externally,  but  continuing  using  the  name   
  ‘Macedonia’ internally)
  In  the  second  half  of  2012,  the  Cypriot  Presidency  gets  under  heavy  diplomatic   
  pressure to make a move towards Turkey and unblocks the opening of negotiations   
  for five additional chapters. Cyprus also drops its veto on signing of a Stabilisation   
  and Association Agreement with Kosovo, provided that Serbia is granted the status of   
  EU candidate.  
  2013: The Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo is 
  signed. Serbia and Albania get the status of candidate countries. 
  2014:  Following  a  comprehensive  agreement  on  land  ownership  on  the  island 
  (involving important financial compensations paid by the EU), Turkey fully recognises   
  the Greek Cypriot authorities and decides to permanently open its ports to Cypriot   
  vessels. Serbia agrees on a territorial exchange with Kosovo allowing it to retain the   
  Serbian populated North of Kosovo. The EU recognises the Republic of Kosovo under   
  its constitutional name. Serbia and Albania are opening accession negotiations. 
  2015: Turkey launches PUDISTEA (Public Diplomacy Surge for Turkish EU Accession) 
  in order to reverse EU public opinion on Turkish EU membership, with a budget of   
  €100m over five years. During the first nine months of the campaign, the level of   
  public support within the EU for the accession of Turkey goes up from 22% to 29%.   
  In parallel, Turkey also sets up the ‘TUDIF’ (or Turkish Diaspora Integration Funds)   
  shaped on the model of the European Social Funds in order to raise the level of   
  professional qualification of Turkish citizens living the EU. 
  2016: In the second year of PUDISTEA implementation, public support to Turkish 
  accession has climbed to 36%. After a fundamental local government reform and the   
  restructuring of its police force, Bosnia is given the status of a candidate country. 
  2017: The Republic of North Macedonia becomes a member of the EU. One week 
  later, following a landslide referendum, the country reverts to the name of ‘Republic   
  of Macedonia’. In the third year of PUDISTEA, public support to Turkish accession has   
  climbed to 41%.
  2018:  After  the  transfer  of  former  President  Lukashenka  to  The  Hague,  Belarus 
  expresses it desire to become a member of the EU. In the framework of a EU-Police   
  mission,  Kosovo  has  sent  30  police  trainers  to  Afghanistan.  In  the  fourth  year  of   
  PUDISTEA, public support to Turkish accession has climbed to 47%.
  2019: Serbia, Kosovo and Albania become members of the EU (extensive safeguard 
  clauses regarding the rule of law and freedom of movement). Under the Romanian   
  EU  Presidency,  Moldova,  Ukraine  and  Belarus  are  given  the  status  of  ‘potential   
  candidate countries’. Turkey provides the bulk of peacekeepers in CSDP missions.   
  In the fifth year of PUDISTEA, EU public support for Turkish accession peaks at 51%.  
  2020: After the closure of the last two chapters of the accession negotiations (freedom 
  of movement and Institutions), Turkey becomes a member of the EU. The Accession   
  treaty provides for a 20-year transition period before full freedom of movement and   
  establishment for Turkish citizens in the EU will be realised. Turkey’s number of votes   
  in the Council of Ministers and EP seats will be frozen until 2040.62
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Notes
1  It is, in particular, the negative public opinion in France that has prompted Paris to block five 
  negotiation chapters on its own.
2  Before the 2004 reforms of the Council’s rules of procedures, it was common that every member 
  state made a statement on a given proposal during a Council meeting, regardless how repetitive   
  this statement proved to be. A purely ceremonial tour de table could thus easily take 1,5 hours out 
  of  such a meeting, reducing the time left for substantial debate. This practice has been abolished   
  under the new rules.
3  According to a 2010 Transatlantic Trends poll, only 22% of EU citizens agree that Turkey joining 
  the EU would be a good thing, down from 30% in 2004 http://trends.gmfus.org/leadership/ 
  TTL2011Topline.pdf.
4  This fact was brilliantly  understood by the Polish Tourist Board when they turned the diffuse 
  fears within the EU of a flood of low skilled workers, personified by the the ‘Polish plumber’ and   
  the ‘Polish nurse’, into a reverse advertising campaign, which contributed to offsetting the poor   
  image of Polish migrants. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4115164.stm
Conclusion
This scenario certainly includes some elements of wishful thinking. However, all sides 
with a stake in the enlargement process must realise that a strong and fresh impetus 
is needed for setting the process back on track, which implies a degree of fresh and 
unconventional thinking. Member states have to think about how to reassure their 
peers that are blocking further negotiations out of concerns for their national political 
agendas. The (potential) candidates have to increase their awareness that if they fail to 
address the (perceived) concerns of the wider EU public, most of their objective efforts 
towards accession may be invalidated. 
The role of public administration in this process is crucial since many of the questions 
related to enlargement (such as the status of Kosovo or the FYROM name issue) are 
highly politically and emotionally charged. Approaching these issues on a technical, 
rather than from a political level, might open up new perspectives. The European Coal 
and Steel community managed to set the agenda for a United Europe on a technical 
level, which later created a spill-over effect and became manifestly political. In the same 
way, civil servants can work around the political blockages on the political level and 
thus set new parameters for political decision-making. Every administration should 
therefore foster unorthodox and ‘out-of-the-box’ thinking without political blinders 
within its ranks. Politicians are naturally wary of confronting hostile public opinions. 
Getting the right arguments from the administrative level can make their task easier 
and, hopefully, contribute to getting a blocked political process back on track. 